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GLOBALIZATION AND CHINA’S ‘RACE TO THE BOTTOM’ IN 
LABOUR STANDARDS 
Anita Chan 
In November 2001 China officially joined the WTO after trying for a decade to be 
accepted. The last country to hold out against China’s entry was not the United States. 
It was Mexico. One might ask: why Mexico? An explanation will soon follow, but I’d 
like to assure you that this is more than a footnote in trade history.  
The Chinese government rejoiced on the occasion of gaining WTO membership. In 
Chinese, the expressions ‘globalization’ and ‘China merging rails with the world’ 
have been the subject of many books that line the shelves in China’s bookshops. 
These have become household words in China. There was an expectation in China 
that, once the country became integrated into the world economy, China would be on 
the right track to attain economic prosperity. There might be some bumps along the 
way; some industries and agriculture would suffer, affecting employment, but as a 
whole, it was predicted, China would gain. Employment has been a major concern in 
China, and the government’s best sell was that foreign investment would increase and 
the labour-intensive manufacturing sector would gain—according to one estimate, 2.8 
million additional jobs in textiles and 2.6 million jobs in the garment trade, as the 
constraints of quotas for garments and textiles end.1  
As predicted, foreign investment has been flowing into China in the past year at the 
expense of its southeast Asian neighbours and the tiger economies of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Korea and even Japan. Hong Kong and Taiwan have been the nurturers of 
Chinese export industries for more than a decade, only to discover now that some of 
their own industries are being ‘hollowed out’.2 As one observer, William Greider, 
describes it, China is ‘sucking away’ jobs. ‘Globalization’, he writes, ‘is entering a 
fateful new stage, in which the competitive perils intensify for the low-wage 
developing countries. … In the “race to the bottom”, China is defining the bottom.’3
                                                 
1 Gongren Ribao (Worker’s Daily), 19 November 2001. 
2 George Wehrfritz and Mahlon Meyer, with Hideko Takayama, “Trapped in a Chinese Box,” 
Newsweek, 18 February 2002. 
3 William Greider, “A New Giant Sucking Sound,” The Nation, 31 December 2001. 
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In other words, though employment in the low-wage industries in China may be 
expanding, the wages of Chinese workers are not rising. For the rest of the talk I’ll try 
to analyse why. What it is in the Chinese system that allows it to lead in this race to 
the bottom in labour standards?  
Labour standards, a term that was once used almost exclusively within labour and 
government circles, rarely in social-science academic writings, is making an inroad 
into ordinary conversations, in political speeches and in the mainstream press. It refers 
to wages, work hours, shopfloor conditions, work intensity and occupational safety 
and health hazards. First, let me go through some empirical evidence that wages in 
China are very low relative to the cost of living compared with other developing 
export-oriented countries.  
There is a popular image that the global divide in competition in world trade is merely 
a North–South affair. I would like to argue here that increasingly the competition, 
particularly in the labour-intensive industries, is largely a South–South matter, among 
countries in the developing world. I shall take the apparel industry to illustrate my 
point, because this is an industry that is quite globalized and footloose and that uses a 
vast supply of Third World labour. The intense competition in wages among the 
Southern countries is well illustrated by this chart, which shows the minimum legal 
wage in a number of countries around the world as of 1999. 
Source: Based on wage figures provided by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International 
Labor Affairs, Wages, Benefits, Poverty Line, and Meeting Workers’ Needs in the Apparel and 
Footwear Industries in Selected Countries, Washington DC., Department of Labor, 2000, p. I-51. 
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Graph 5:  Minimum Wage Standards of Textile, Garment and Footwear Workers in Different 
Countries, 1999 (in US Dollars)
Lowest Minimum Wage Standards 40 15 35 12 125 52 93 60 476 858
Highest Minimum Wage Standards 40 34 45 39 125 52 109 65 476 858
Cambodia Indonesia Vietnam China El Salvador Nicaragua Thailand Mexico Taiwan US
The chart shows the enormous wage gap between the minimum wage in the United 
States and that of developing countries in Asia and Central America, at an order of at 
least 20 times. All of the minimum legal wages in the developing countries hovered 
around 30 to 50 American dollars a month, equivalent in China to 240 to 400 yuan a 
month. The legal minimum wage in Shenzhen, the Chinese city with the highest 
minimum wage, was only 42 US dollars. China has set its minimum wage standards 
very low, and is even competitive with Vietnam and Cambodia, two countries where 
the cost of living is lower than in China. In Mexico, El Salvador and Nicaragua, the 
wage levels are slightly higher than Asian wages, but this competitive disadvantage is 
cancelled out by the proximity of Central America to the American market. 
Faced by cheap labour abroad in this era of global production, the garment industry is 
basically finished in the U.S. and, closer to home, in Australia. It exists only among 
pockets of illegal immigrants4 and home workers,5 ‘sweating’ as exploited underpaid 
workers.  
When China first instituted a minimum legal wage system in the early 1990s, it had 
the good intention of protecting workers in the export sector. But soon the function of 
the minimum wage changed character. It simply became the amount that employers 
used to gauge how much they should pay their workers in the labour-intensive export 
industries. Inasmuch as the majority of the workers in this sector are migrant workers 
from the countryside, this wage level applies mostly to migrants, who, as seen in 
Table 2 (below), are not sharing in the standard of living of the urban population. 
First, it should be noted that the setting of a minimum wage level is extremely 
decentralized in China. In Australia, we have one minimum wage, but in China 
there are hundreds. Each city or even a district in a city can set its own minimum 
wage based on a formula provided by the central government. This takes into 
account the cost of living in the locality, the prevailing wage, the rate of inflation 
etc., and it is adjusted each year. You can see in this Table that the minimum 
wage has been rising every year, but when I compared these rises with the annual 
price indexes for each of these cities I discovered that the rises in the minimum 
                                                 
4 Peter Kwong, Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor, New York; New 
Press. 
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legal wage have almost exactly kept pace with inflation. In other words, even 
though the Chinese economy is rapidly developing, in real terms the minimum 
wages have remained level throughout the 1990s. 
TABLE 2 
Proportion of minimum wages to employees’ average wages in Chinese cities 
(1993–2000) 
 
Monthly wage in yuan 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
  Minimum 
Wage (M) 
Average 
Wage (A) 
M/A 
% 
Minimum 
Wage (M)
Average 
Wage (A)
M/A
% 
Minimum 
Wage (M)
Average 
Wage (A)
M/A
% 
Minimum 
Wage (M) 
Average 
Wage (A) 
M/A 
% 
Beijing  N/A     200/210 545 36.70/
38.53
210/240 678.7 30.94/
35.36
210/270 798.3 26.31/ 
33.82 
Tianjin N/A 340   N/A 447   210 541.8 38.76 270 636.9 42.39 
Shanghai 210 470.8 44.60 220 616.8 35.67 220/270 773.3 28.45/
34.91
220/300 888.6 24.76/ 
33.76 
Guangzhou 250 533.3 46.88 250 735.9 33.97 320 883.7 36.21 380 1022 37.20 
Shenzhen 280 694.6 40.31 285 901.3 31.62 380 1070 35.52 398 1242 32.05 
Chongqing N/A 262.1   N/A 355.2   N/A 404.2   180 417.5 43.11 
 
Monthly wage in yuan 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Minimum 
Wage (M) 
Average 
Wage (A) 
M/A 
% 
Minimum 
Wage (M)
Average 
Wage (A)
M/A
% 
Minimum 
Wage (M)
Average 
Wage (A)
M/A Minimum 
Wage (M) 
Average 
Wage (A) 
M/A 
Beijing  290 918.3 31.58 N/A 1024   310 1148 27.00 412 1362.5 30.24 
Tianjin 290 686.5 42.24 N/A 824.6   290 920.5 31.50 350 1040 33.65 
Shanghai 315 952.1 33.08 325 1005 32.34 N/A 1179   445 1544.3 28.82 
Guangzhou 380 1143 33.26 380 1255 30.27 380 1434 26.49 450 1590.9 28.29 
Shenzhen 420 1408 29.83 430 1575 27.31 430 1804 23.84 547 N/A   
Chongqing 210 458.5 45.80 N/A 430.8   210 525 40.00 290 581.7 49.86 
 
 Proportion >= 40% 
 
Sources: Average wages are from various statistical yearbooks and minimum wages are from various 
sources, including newspapers and labour bureaus. Shenzhen entry is the inner, higher, zone. 
 
As you can see, too, the cities in Guangdong province and other big cities along 
the coast have the highest cost of living  and consequently the highest minimum 
wages. Elsewhere in China, the legal minimum wages are lower, which poses a 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Robert J. S. Ross, “Declining Labor Standards in the North American Apparel Industry,” in G. Kohler 
and E. J. Chaves, eds., Gobalization: Critical Perspectives, New York: Nova Science, 2003, pp.277-
293. 
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threat to the coastal region. The result of this threat, as I shall explain, is shown in 
this table.  
Legally, the minimum wage in each locality is not simply supposed to keep up with 
inflation. According to the international standard employed by the Chinese 
government, a minimum wage of a locality should be set within the range of 40 to 60 
per cent of the average wage in that locality.6 This table uses 40 per cent as the cut-off 
point to see whether the minimum wages officially set by various localities have 
reached this standard in past years. 1993 was the only year in which all of these 
minimum wages fulfilled the Chinese government’s own criterion of reaching at least 
40 per cent of the average wages. Since 1993, in most localities and years, the 
minimum legal wages did not attain even this 40 per cent mark, in direct violation of 
the national directive requiring that it do so. Instead, with only a few exceptions (see 
the squares shaded in grey), the general trend in minimum wages has been one of 
stagnation or steady decline when compared to the incomes of urban residents. This 
results, for example, in the minimum legal wage in Beijing declining from 36.7% of 
Beijing’s average wage in 1994 to only 27% in 1999, and in Shenzhen City from 40% 
in 1993 to a bit under 24% in 1999. This means China’s income gap between its 
regular urban population and the migrant workers kept on widening in the 90s.7
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that 
globalization rarely leads to improved wage conditions for the workers who make 
the exported goods compared to the populace at large. Guangzhou and Shenzhen, 
the two cities that have the highest average income in the country and the first 
cities in China that the central government allowed to woo foreign investment, 
have the lowest minimum wage to average wage percentage. In these two cities it 
did not even reach 30%. The worst of all the nine cities is Shenzhen, the most 
famous model of a special export zone in China. The percentages in these two 
cities have been consistently the lowest of the nine cities since 1997, dropping to 
a low of 23.8% in 1999. On the other hand, in Chongqing City in the interior of 
China, which is the least linked with the global economy, the legal minimum 
                                                 
6 See Notice concerning Regulations of Enterprises’ Minimum Wages, issued by the Chinese Ministry 
of Labour on 24 November 1993. 
7 This trend parallels China’s increasing Gini coefficient in the 90s—0.42 in 1996 to 0.458 in 2000 
(Zhongguo Gaige Bao [Chinese Reform News], 11 September 2001). A Gini coefficient of 0.4 is 
considered high internationally. 
 5
wage reached that mark of 40% in 1999. These figures reflect a very worrying 
trend. As a region becomes richer, it violates the national guidelines and seeks to 
maintain its attractiveness to foreign capital by keeping its minimum wage level 
low, to compete with other localities in China in selling the labour of migrant 
workers. The benefits of globalization in accordance with this competitive logic 
has not, and will not, trickle down to those who make the products. 
What is even worse—and is not revealed by this table—is that while on paper the 
local governments comply with the central government’s decrees about raising 
minimum wage levels annually to adjust to the average urban wage and to 
inflation, in reality the wages of the migrant industrial workers are often 
considerably lower than the official standards. For one thing, the minimum wage, 
set by the month, does not reveal the illegally long hours worked by migrant 
workers to attain that minimum. According to a survey I conducted in China’s 
footwear industry, the average number of work hours came to about 11 hours 
each day, often with no days off—that is, an 80-hour workweek. Nor do the 
official statistics take into consideration the staggering amount of wages owed but 
not paid to the migrant workers.  43% of the 51,000 cases of workers’ complaints 
lodged by letters and by personal visits to the Shenzhen authorities during 2001 
related to unpaid wages.8 One Chinese newspaper article describes it as having 
become a ‘custom’ in Guangdong9; while another described it as an ‘incurable 
disease’.10 When the illegally long work hours and these unpaid wages are taken 
into account, a sizeable proportion of the workers are making considerably less 
than the legal minimum wage. 
The officially set minimum wage levels also do not tell the whole story in other 
ways. They do not show the violence and physical abuses that have become 
pervasive in the factories in China owned and managed by Taiwanese, Koreans 
and Hong Kong Chinese, nor the acute and chronic occupational health and safety 
issues. A startlingly high incidence of severed limbs and fingers has been 
recorded. In Shenzhen City alone, there were over 10,000 certified cases in 1999 
among a migrant population of some 3 to 4 million. As China develops, the 
                                                 
8 Zhongguo Laodong Baozhang Bao (Chinese Labour Insurance News), 19 February 2002. 
9 Gongren Ribao, 9 May 2001. 
10 Zhongguo Laodong Baozhang Bao, 19 February 2002. 
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benefits have not trickled down to the assembly-line workers from largely rural 
backgrounds who make the exported goods. Indeed, their situation has grown 
even worse since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98; the downturn intensified 
competition with Southeast Asian labour, which had become much cheaper in the 
wake of currency devaluations. Earlier I mentioned that foreign investment has 
been rushing into China at the expense of its Asian neighbours. Among the 
reasons why China is attractive is that it is able to hold down its wages by turning 
a blind eye to labour violations.  
Competition within China between different regions exacerbates this problem of low 
wages, and the central government has intervened in a way that encourages even 
lower pay. Though migrant workers’ wages in Guangdong province are very low, the 
central government has been worried that Guangdong is pricing itself out of the 
international market. The government therefore has started to encourage foreign 
capital to move inland, to places where the pay is even lower. In fact, an Australian 
toy company owner who sources some of her merchandize from China noted last 
week that she is now sourcing from factories further north and away from big cities. 
The products, she said, are just as good and cheaper. 
Let us now look in detail at how this geographic race to the bottom in China also 
operates at the international level. In the 1990s, China’s main competitor for the 
American garment market was Mexico, on the other side of the globe. Since the 
signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (or NAFTA), Mexico has 
gained a large number of clothing factories. Today China and Mexico are competing 
neck and neck for the US market, each supplying around 15 per cent of all apparel 
imports to the US. Mexico enjoys two substantial advantages over China: it is next 
door to the US (and hence can meet a faster turnover rate for orders), and it enjoys an 
absence of quota restrictions due to NAFTA. As a result, Asian investors who serve as 
the subcontractors for the name-brand Western multinationals—and these are 
particularly South Koreans and Taiwanese—became increasingly active there in the 
1990s, even moving apparel production out of Asia to Mexico. Along the US–
Mexican border assembly plants called maquiladoras have mushroomed, employing 
about one million migrant workers. This number is still small compared to the 12 
million in Guangdong province alone, but it represents a 150 per cent increase since 
1990.  
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As in China, expansion in employment does not mean rising wages for Mexican 
migrant workers, but unlike China, wage levels are more regulated in Mexico. Only 
three minimum wage levels exist for the entire country, from 93 to 108 US dollars per 
month. Though low, they are still almost double that of Shenzhen. But Mexico’s legal 
minimum wages fell by almost half during the 1990s, due in part to the peso’s 
collapse in 1996. In the manufacturing sector, real wages dropped by 20 per cent over 
the same period. In the apparel industry, according to the International Labor 
Organization’s estimate, the migrant workers’ wages shed 28 per cent of their 
purchasing power in the period between 1994 and 1999. 
Since 2000, the maquiladoras have been losing ground. As trade barriers continue to 
fall due to the WTO, the middleman firms from Taiwan and South Korea have begun 
shifting production back to Asia, particularly China. The numbers of maquiladoras 
swelled from 120 in the 1970s to 3,700 in 2000, but have dropped by 500 since then. 
Pressures are tightening on Mexican factories to compete with China’s long working 
hours and bargain-basement wages. That explains why, as I pointed out at the 
beginning of the talk, Mexico was the last country to sign a trade agreement with 
China, delaying China’s entry into the WTO. Mexico knew that it would have much 
to lose when the trade barriers were removed, but the international pressure was too 
great for Mexico to stand its ground. 
Both governments, competing to provide foreign investors with attractively low 
wages, are trying to entice the foreign investors to go to cheaper regions of their 
countries. In Mexico, the government has proposed a ‘Puebla to Panama Plan’ which 
would build an investment corridor for more maquiladoras from southern Mexico 
through Central America—at wages cheaper than at the US–Mexican border. In 
China, as noted, the government is encouraging foreign investors to go north and 
inland in pursuit of even lower wages.  
These pressures may threaten the incremental growth of an autonomous Mexican 
trade union movement —a result of years of painstaking political and social change, 
supported by a solidarity movement in the United States and Canada. Employers who 
resist relocating to China or to other low-wage countries will be tempted to lower 
labour standards in Mexico by breaking the fledgling union movement. In China, no 
autonomous union movement is in sight in the foreseeable future to fight to preserve 
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wage levels, and the Chinese government is intent on making sure that none is 
allowed to arise. 
There are numerous other reasons that Chinese wages can be kept so competitive. 
First, it has an almost inexhaustible supply of cheap labour from the countryside. 
Second, the decentralization and deregulation in wage-setting under China’s 
economic reforms enabled local governments to turn a blind eye to labour 
exploitation. There is also a third fundamental reason—China’s so-called hukou 
(household registration) system, which prevents an uncontrolled rural-to-urban influx 
of population. This works in similar ways to the pass system under South Africa’s 
former system of apartheid. 
Some of you may immediately react against such a comparison, so let me emphasize 
here that the two systems differ markedly from each other in origin and ideology. The 
South African pass system was intertwined with a history of racism, colonialism and 
the development of South African capitalism, all of which favoured control of the 
movement of African people to provide greater political security and enhanced 
efficiency in the use of black labour. The ideology on which the system was based 
was white supremacy, and apartheid was the cornerstone of the South African white 
ruling elite’s state-building project after the Second World War. 
The hukou system in China has a much shorter history. It was established after the 
Communist Party came to power in 1949. To ensure that the planned economy met 
the urban people’s basic needs, a rationing system was instituted in the 1950s, which 
in turn required the registration of people. As ration coupons could only be used in the 
locality where they were issued, this automatically restricted the geographical 
mobility of all people, not just peasants.11
To reside in a different locality, one needed a special temporary certificate. This 
system of passes has been retained to the present day. It is the way this system 
constrains the geographical mobility of migrant workers, and the way it can drive 
down wages and other labour standards today, that is similar to what prevailed in 
South Africa. In China it is there by default. It was in place before it had its present 
                                                 
11 Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,” 
China Quarterly, no. 139, September 1994, pp. 644-668. 
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function. It simply continued to be used, when it was found to work well under a 
greatly changed system. 
This system serves an economic function in this transitional period from socialism to 
capitalism. The passes act like sluice gates controlling the influx of labour. The hukou 
system helps to regulate the flow, letting in more labourers when needed, and driving 
them out when their number is excessive, or when their numbers stretch local 
facilities to the limit. When workers lose their ability to work through industrial 
accidents, or when they have become too ‘old’ by the age of about 30 to keep up with 
the break-neck work intensity, the pass system enables cities to ship them back to the 
countryside to get rid of them, because without a job a migrant has no right to stay in 
an urban area. This kind of labour flexibility cannot be as easily imposed on the local 
urban population. 
For local governments, allowing the migrants to come can be lucrative. Migrant 
workers generate tax revenues for the local government by attracting companies that 
want cheap labour but, because of the hukou system, the local government has no 
responsibility to pay anything for the welfare of these temporary sojourners, who are 
not eligible for any of the medical or housing or unemployment benefits available to 
the local urban populace. Nor are the workers from the countryside allowed by 
China’s pass system to bring their families with them, and thus the urban government 
has no additional educational expenses to meet.  
Despite this pass system, the enormous bureaucratic edifice that was erected to 
control the influx of migrants has not been able to stem the flow, just as in South 
Africa. It is impossible to estimate the exact number of Chinese peasants surging out 
of poor regions in search of jobs, but a range between 60 to 80 million is often cited. 
In the week immediately after the Chinese New Year, when migrant workers who 
have gone home for the festival return to the cities, bringing with them relatives and 
friends, the effect on transport is dramatic. For instance, in a matter of days 
Guangzhou, the largest city in South China, suddenly has to handle several millions of 
migrant workers simultaneously descending upon it by trains and buses. Earlier this 
year, the Guangdong provincial government, in the hope to dampening this vast 
simultaneous inflow, announced that factories should not recruit new migrants at that 
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time of year, but still 5.2 million migrants poured in after the New Year, a quarter of a 
million more than the year before.12  
This large volume of people looking for low-end jobs drives down wages and work 
conditions and allows them to be exploited by employers, who can pay them at the 
lowest possible wages. New arrivals, in particular, desperate to recoup the amount 
they have invested in transport expenses and in applying for the array of necessary 
documents and certificates before leaving home, will take any job available.  
Here is the case of one migrant reported in a Chinese newspaper. The young migrant 
was informed by a friend that if he went to Shenzhen he would find a job. But he was 
advised that before he left he had to apply for a number of documents. These included 
a ‘border region pass’ (at 120 yuan, taking six months), a personal identity card 
(another 80 yuan, taking a month), an unmarried status certificate (60 yuan, valid for a 
one-year certificate), a certificate to prove that he was not born out of quota (45 yuan, 
valid for a year), all of these totalling 305 yuan.13 To put this into perspective, the 
minimum wage in Shenzhen in 2000 was 547 yuan for a full month’s work, and this 
young man would be lucky if he could enter a factory that would pay him as much as 
that minimum wage. 
On arrival in Shenzhen, armed with these documents, he thought he could become a 
‘legal’ migrant worker and could begin working without a problem. But the factory 
demanded 300 yuan as a deposit before it would give him the job. He then had to 
spend 40 yuan for a work permit, and another 300 yuan for a temporary residence 
permit. In short, on arrival at his destination he had to spend another 640 yuan. In all, 
without including transport costs, he had to spend almost twice as much as the 
monthly wage. Most new migrants therefore are usually in debt after they first arrive 
in a city. 
According to official statistics, each of the 3 or 4 million migrants in the Shenzhen 
Economic Zone on average spends 600 yuan a year on certificates, amounting to 
almost 10% of their total annual income.14 The migrants have to carry these 
documents with them at all times or else, if caught without them, they may be thrown 
                                                 
12 Clara Li, “Migrant Workers out in Cold,” South China Morning Post, 26 February 2002. 
13 Yangcheng Wanbao (Guangzhou Evening News), 30 March 2001. 
14 Ibid. 
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into detention. To possess all of the certificates, one needs to hold a job, and so there 
is a nervous race to secure one. The deposit that this migrant needed to pay to the 
employer is symptomatic of the desperate situation of most migrant workers. Paying a 
substantial deposit has become a common practice at the foreign-funded factories. At 
first sight, the practice seems paradoxical. Instead of the employer paying workers for 
the work performed, the workers first have to provide a payment to the employers as 
surety for the job. The deposit obliges the workers to remain at the factory, or they 
forfeit it. To all intents and purposes the worker is a bonded labourer.15
Another practice used by many unscrupulous employers is not to pay a portion of the 
wages every month, promising to pay the rest at the end of the year. In this situation, 
the longer a worker has worked, the more money he or she is owed by the employer, 
and the more difficult it is for the worker to leave. This leaves the worker vulnerable, 
scared to forfeit all of these unpaid wages when facing poor treatment at the hands of 
managers. 
Finally, and perhaps most effective of all, a widespread practice is for employers to 
take away the migrant workers’ documents. Without these the workers could not look 
for another job under China’s ‘pass book’ system even when the work conditions are 
intolerable and they desperately want to quit. 
Workers’ dormitories, usually located within the factory compounds, extend 
management control over workers’ lives beyond the work hours. Movement into and 
out of the factory compound can be monitored and controlled. Disciplining workers is 
easier because there is near-total control over them. Especially in the factories in 
China managed by Taiwanese and Koreans, the discipline is so strict that the 
management style can be described as militaristic. In some of the bigger factories that 
I have visited, workers are even marched to and from meals and to and from 
dormitories in tight military-style squads.16
A pass system needs an enforcement agent—in this case the police—and their 
behaviour toward migrant workers has become associated with corruption and abuses 
of power. Under the hukou system, much as in apartheid-era South Africa, detention 
                                                 
15 Chan, 2000. 
16 Anita Chan, “Regimented Workers in China’s Free Labour Market,” China Perspectives, no. 9 
(January-February1997), pp. 12-16. 
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by the police if caught without the necessary papers is an inherent part of the system. 
Detentions are associated not only with fines but also with mistreatment, physical 
violence, forced bribery and deportation out of the city. With so many migrants 
pouring in, the arrests are essentially random. People who seem to be of rural origin 
are simply pulled off the streets and roughed up, sometimes for no particular reason. 
Based on a pilot study I conducted very recently with ten young migrants to test out a 
questionnaire, within the several months they had been in Shenzhen five said they had 
been picked up by the police, a few of them more than once; and nine out of the ten 
knew of a friend or relative who had been detained. 
Many migrants do not have all the right papers because they are not aware of what 
they need. Others are too poor to buy them all. But often, through no fault of their 
own, their documents are kept locked up by the employer they are working for, or 
they have left a factory without being able to get their documents back because the 
employer did not want them to leave. As a result, the borrowing of documents from 
friends and the purchase of forged ones off the street has become very common,17 as it 
was in South Africa. According to one survey conducted by a government labour 
bureau in Guangdong, 80 per cent of the foreign employers openly admitted that they 
did not care whether the documents were fake or not, as this did not affect production. 
When the infringement of regulations is so widespread, this implies that tacit approval 
has been granted by the local authorities and police. 
Yet this does not stop the police from detaining migrants arbitrarily. Police stations 
consider this a lucrative business, because bail and fines and forced bribes, also 
imposed arbitrarily, can cost up to a few hundred yuan. The practice has got out of 
hand in the past couple of years, to the extent that the Guangdong provincial 
government felt it had to pass a regulation in March this year emphasizing that the 
regulation for detaining ‘vagabonds’ should be restricted to beggars and not applied to 
migrant workers who do not have the right papers on them.18 Rather than obediently 
comply with the regulation, the provincial police responded by declaring they have 
not been misusing the regulation, that they have done a good job in sheltering beggars 
and vagabonds, and they reaffirmed the necessity of rigorously implementing the pass 
                                                 
17 Anita Chan, “The Culture of Survival: Lives of Migrant Workers Through the Prism of Private 
Letters,” in Perry Link, Richard Madsen and Paul Pickowicz, eds., Popular China: Unofficial Culture 
in a globalizing Society, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, pp. 163–188. 
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system, without mentioning that they had been detaining and abusing large numbers 
of migrant workers.19 Those who gain from the system are not going to desist so 
easily. 
As can be seen, the Chinese hukou system and the pass system under apartheid in 
South Africa generated quite similar outcomes. They produced a large underclass 
living in constant insecurity and vulnerability, accompanied by daily discrimination, 
suppression, hardship and denial of their human dignity.  
Now let us go back to comparing how the Chinese hukou system can keep wages 
down more easily than can be done in Mexico. In Mexico, as noted, the workers who 
produce for export similarly are largely migrants from the countryside and similarly 
the majority are female, but there is a difference. Almost all of the Chinese migrant 
female workers are single women in their late teens or early twenties who, because of 
the household registration system, cannot bring their families with them.20 Practically 
all of the factories make sure that they only recruit single women by asking to see 
their officially issued identity certificates which, in keeping with the Chinese state’s 
strict family-planning policy, require all women to have their marital and family 
planning status listed. Since the workers are all poor single women living in 
dormitories, management only needs to pay them enough for their individual 
survival.21
In Mexico the context is different. Most of the women workers in the maquiladoras 
are migrants from poorer regions, but since there is no pass system many of them 
have come with their families, and quite a number are single mothers. Very often 
these women workers are the sole breadwinners. Since they live with their families, 
part of their waking hours have to be spent on ‘unproductive’ chores (from 
management’s vantage point): commuting, household tasks such as cooking, taking 
care of the old and the young. No matter how ruthless, there is a limit to the amount of 
overtime work that management can squeeze out of these Mexican workers—less 
than they can with the young single women in dormitories in China.  
                                                                                                                                            
18 Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily, Guangzhou), 29 March 2002. 
19 Yangcheng Wanbao, 22 April 2002. 
20 Chan, op. cit., 2002. 
21  Chan, op. cit., 2002. 
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There are legal pressures in Mexico to pay workers a bit more so that they can at least 
provide for part of their families’ livelihood. The Mexican Labour Law states: ‘The 
minimum wage must be sufficient to satisfy the normal necessities of the head of the 
family in the material, social and cultural order, and to provide for the obligatory 
education of his children.’ This article echoes Article 25 in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of the United Nations. It is similar to the concept of a living wage. 
Although in reality the minimum wage levels set in Mexico are far below the standard 
stipulated in the law, the notion of a wage that can provide for a family exists. 
No such concept of a ‘living wage’ exists in the Chinese discourse on wages, nor is it 
stipulated in the Chinese Labour Law. Instead, even the migrant workers’ protests do 
not centre on how low the wages are, but rather revolve mainly around unpaid wages. 
Only when workers have not been paid for several months, when the situation 
becomes desperate, do the workers begin to protest. Local governments in Guangdong 
province occasionally launch campaigns, especially just before Chinese New Year, to 
collect unpaid wages or unpaid payments for overtime work.22 But this campaign 
style of collecting unpaid wages only touches the tip of the iceberg.23 The expectation 
of adequate labour standards is much lower in China than in Mexico. 
In China, the official trade union is an arm of the party–state. It has little autonomous 
space to protect labour rights. In fact, because of the massive influx of foreign capital 
and the rapid rate of industrialization, the trade union’s efforts, even when undertaken 
with good will, face a near-impossible task. A parallel situation existed in Mexico, 
where the trade union was affiliated with the government, but since the defeat of the 
former ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, in the last election there is 
now a fledgling independent trade union movement. This is challenging the old 
unions’ authoritarian and pro-management practices with the help of North American 
trade unions and the anti-sweatshop movement. This anti-sweatshop movement is 
composed of trade unions, NGOs, labour advocates, university students, human rights 
groups and church groups. It grew rapidly in the nineties, and has become a force that 
can no longer be ignored by both multinational corporations and governments. The 
sensational stories of poor working conditions in Mexico that the anti-sweatshop 
                                                 
22 Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily), 13 March 2000; Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (Chinese 
Commercial News), 5 July 1994. 
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movement has publicized in America and the direct support they have been giving to 
Mexican workers have been invaluable to Mexican labour activists in the 
maquiladoras. Still, however, the impact of the movement to counteract the global 
competition and the race to the bottom is limited and sporadic. 
Ripples of the anti-sweatshop movement have spread to Asia and China. The concept 
of corporate social responsibility is just beginning to circulate in China, because the 
factories there run by contactors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea now feel 
pressure from the Western multinationals which source from them. The multinationals 
have nervously begun to urge them to upgrade their labour conditions. However, the 
factories being monitored by the multinationals are just a small minority of the better 
and bigger factories, among the thousands and thousands of factories that subcontract 
production. The potential role of the state becomes important here. A willingness by 
the Chinese government to enforce its own laws would be much more effective than 
sporadic monitoring, but the Chinese government has not yet awakened to the 
growing pressures emanating in the West for improved labour standards in the export 
industries. 
There are a few weak rays of hope emerging in the past two years elsewhere in Asia. 
Three countries, Cambodia, Vietnam and more recently Thailand, have expressed 
interest in improving labour standards to attract foreign capital. Cambodia has signed 
a bilateral US–Cambodia Agreement which accepts linking labour standards to trade 
and has agreed to let the ILO monitor progress. The Vietnamese government has 
publicly encouraged its factories to try to raise standards in order to acquire the 
certifications issued by an American-based organization that verifies labour standards 
for Western corporations. The Thai government is currently engaging in talks with 
this organization to operate training programs to upgrade labour standards in 
Thailand. That is to say, three Asian countries are now taking a new direction in their 
industrial development strategies. They are trying to attract foreign investment and 
trade by raising labour standards instead of depressing them. 
I have no idea whether China is aware of this new strategy adopted by its Asian 
neighbours. So far, however, China has not shown any signs of changing its policy of 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Based on an interview in Guangzhou City in November 2001 with a reporter from a Guangdong 
provincial newspaper. 
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low labour standards. The government has not publicly addressed the issue of 
corporate social responsibility, unlike the Vietnamese government. The Guangdong 
provincial government has tried to alleviate some of the most blatant abuses, but no 
fundamental change in policy has been adopted. Let me quote here the director of the 
human rights program in Asia for Reebok, 
Who enforces Chinese labour laws? Nobody. If it were enforced China would 
be a much better place for millions of people to work in. But it is ignored more 
than in any other country I work in.  
 There have been a few reforms of the Chinese hukou system, but only to allow 
successful people with considerable money or education to apply for an urban hukou. 
The controls over the unskilled migrant workers who work on the production lines or 
construction sites, imposed by the pass system, remain the same. And the police seem 
adamantly against any changes. The hukou pass system seems likely to remain in 
place for the foreseeable future, and China will continue to dominate the world’s 
export market, to the point that the initiatives taken by Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Thailand may possibly collapse under the weight of Chinese competition. 
I am sorry that my talk has to end on this pessimistic note. 
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